World Equilibrium with Oil Price Increases: An Intertemporal Analysis by Nancy Peregrim Marion & Lars E.O. Svensson





Working Paper No. 10714




Phe research reported here is part of the NBER's research program
in International Studies. Any opinions expressed are those of the
authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NSER Working Paper #1074
February1983
World Equilibrium with Oil Price Increases:
An Inter temporal Analysis
A38TRACT
Thispaper examines the effect of OPEC price increases on the welfare
of a group of oil—Importing industrial countries. It also studies how
taxes or subsidies on oil Imports or capital flows could alter the group's
welfare. The analysis is conducted using a general—equilibrium model that
describes the behavior of two actors, OPEC and the oil—importing bloc called
Industria. The analysis is explicitly intertemporal and takes into account
endogenous changes in saving, investment and employment.
We show that Industria'g welfare is affected not only by direct oil
terms of trade effect, but also by changes in the world rate of interest
(intertemporal terms of trade effects) and, for rigid wages, changes in
employment. Thus Industriagains from the intertemporal terms of trade
effectif it is a net borrower and the world rate of Interest falls. Precise
conditions for whether the world rate of interest falls or rises are given.
We also show that Industria maygainfrom subsidizing oil imports
ratherthan taxing them, in particular ifwages are rigid, and that it may
gainfrom restricting international capital mobility.
NancyPeregrlm Marion Lars E.0. Svensson
Department of Economics Institute for International
Dartmouth College Economic Studies
Hanover, New Hampshire 03755 5—10691 Stockholm, Sweden
46—8—16 30 75
(603) 646—2511 and





This paper examines the effect of OPEC price increases on the
welfare of a group of oil importers. It also studies Iww taxes or
subsidies on oil imports or capital flows could alter the group's
welfare.
The analysis is conducted using a general—equilibrium model that
describes the behavior of two actors, OPEC and a large oil-importing bloc
1/
called Industria. The analysis is explicitly interteinporal and takes
into account endogenous changes in saving, investment and employment.
There is by now an extensive literature on the macroeconomic
effects of oil price increases. However, this literature mostly relies
on a static, small—economy analysis that maintains fixed values for
world interest rates and traded—goods prices when oil prices increase.
Such a partial—equilibrium and nonintertemporal approach is limiting
2/
and could be misleading.
Two general—equilibrium models of the world economy within an
intertemporal framework have been developed, one by Sachs (1982) and
one by Dixit (1981) ,buttheir models and emphases differ from ours.
Sachs relies on a simulation model to analyze the effects of oil
price increases on such variables as output and prices, capital accumu-
lation, the real interest rate and employment. He also studies the
scope for fiscal and monetary policies in moderating output declines.
We rely on a theoretical construct rather than on a simulation model.
Our use of the duality method, much inspired by Dixit and Norman (1980)
allows us to use rather general specifications for preferences and2
technology instead of special functional forms, and it makes for easily
derived and interpreted results. Our focus is also different. We are
concerned primarily with the welfare effects of oil price increases.
Our calculations show that these welfare effects encompass more than
just the loss of current income due to higher import bills, Of course,
we, too, will be interested in how OPEC price increases change interest
rates and employment, since those changes have implications for Industria's
welfare. In addition, we are interested in how Industria might use
specific tax/subsidy policies to improve its welfare.
Turning to Dixit's work, we note that his model contains an exogenously—
given oil stock, competitive oil pricing by OPEC and the Hotelling rule
which relates present and future oil prices to each other. The model is
used to examine the effect of changes in the stock of oil on wages,
interest and oil prices. It also offers a fascinating look at how the
income distribution effects depend on the endowments of capital, labor
and oil. Dixit assumes all oil revenues and nothing else is invested
(hence present capitalists and workers save nothing) and that full
employment prevails. In contrast, our model specifies exogenous oil
prices, enabling us to distinguish between the impact of present and
future oil price increases on a host of real variables, including pro-
duction, consumption, saving, investment, employment and trade balances.
we, too, are concerned about welf4re effects, but our goal is to measure
theseeffects taking into account the interactions between oil markets,
international capital flows andemploymentvariations.
Ourresultsshow that a rigorous calculation of Industria's changed welfare
musttake into account not only the lost income due to the decline in3
Inaustria's present and future oil terms of trade, but the change in
the real rate of interest. A fall in interest can improve Industria's
welfare if it becomes a future net exporter of final goods to OPEC.
This fall in interest, what we call an improvement in Industria's
intertemporal terms of trade, can moderate the fall in welfare resulting
from the deterioration in the oil terms of trade.
Since the analysis of welfare effects depends crucially on how the
interest rate responds to oil price increases, the factors that influence
its response are carefully examined. We find that the change in interest
depends partly on the size of OPEC's present marginal propensity to
consume relative to Industria's, on whether or not factors of production
3/ are "cooperatnre,"— on how severely current production contracts and on
the nature of the oil price increase—whether it is temporary, permanent
or expected to occur in the future. We are able to qualify precisely
wider what conditions the interest rate might fall)"
The welfare effects of oil price increases are calculated under
conditions of both real wage flexibility and rigidity in Industria. We
find that in the latter case, oil price increases unambiguously cause
greater welfare losses since employment falls and the intertemporal terms
of trade may improve very little or even worsen.
The model provides a rich variety of other results as well. For example,
one can assess the effects of oil price increases on oil imports, consumption,
investment, wages or employment, and the trade balances in the present and
in the future. Among other things, it is shown that when factors are
cooperative, permanent and future oil price increases have an uncertain
Impact in investment in Industria; they have a direct negative effect through4
decreased profitability, but they also stimulate investment byinducing
a fall in the rate of interest. If flexible, real wages fall in the
present when there are OPEC price increases, but they may actually rise
in the future, even if labor and oil are cooperative, should investment
increase sufficiently due to the fall in interest.
In addition to assessing the effects of oil price increases, the
paper examines the general—equilibrium effects of taxesor subsidies
on oil imports and on capital flows. This analysis is motivated by the
fact that for given oil prices, oil importers may be able to alter the
intertemporal terms of trade in their favor. For instance, the oil—
importing bloc can increase its welfare by subsidizing oil imports at
present and taxing them in the future.It can also improve its welfare
by imposing an impediment to international capital flows, namely taxing
capital imports from OPEC.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies how Industria
and OPEC are modeled and how the world equilibrium is defined. In
Section 3, the welfare effects on Industria are derived under assumptions
of full employment, flexible wages and perfect capital mobility. Section
4 deals with the determination of the interest rate and Section 5 with
the effect of OPEC price increases on the trade balance and on wages.
Section 6 introduces rigid wages and variable employment. Section 7 con-
siders the welfare effects of tariffs/subsidies on Industria's oil imports.
Section B looks at the case where Industria restricts capital movements
by taxing borrowing from OPEC. Section 9 presents some concluding
cormuents.S
2. Industria, OPEC and World Equilibrium
Consider a world of two countries, Industria and OPEC. Thereare
two dates, indexed t =1and 2, which are called the present and the
future. At each date final goods and oil are produced. Industria
produces and exports the final goods, using as inputs imported oil and
domestic capital and labor. Industz-ia does not produce any oil, nor
can it store oil. OPEC produces and exports only oil, at zero cost of
production, to satisfy any quantity Industria demands. Both OPEC and
Industria consume only final goods. At each date final goods and oil
are traded at relative prices set by OPEC. The two countries can also
borrow and lend from each other on a world credit market withan endog-
enously—determined rate of interest. In the present, neither country
has inherited debt from the past.
Let us look at Industria, modeling first its production side. We
let x =ft(ktt z) denote its well-behavedconcave production func-
tion at date t, where xt is output of final goods, kt the stock of capital,
the employment level, and the oil input. We shall represent the
production side with the help of the GDP functions yt(1 qt, kt, 2t)
t tt t ttt tt t tt defined by Y Cl, q k ,9,) =max{x —qz x f (k ,t,z
t 5/ where q is the price of oil in terms of final goods in period t. —The
firstargument of the GDP functions, the price of final goods, is set
equal to unity since we shall use final goods as the numeraire.
We let 4,Y,Y and yt denote the patials of the GDP functions
with respect to the arguments 1, qt1 kt, and t, respectively. Using
standard properties of GD? functions, we know that under competitive
conditions, final goods supply, demand for oil and the demand price forlabor in terms of final goods can be given by
tttt t t. (2.1) x Y ,z=-Y,andw y 1 q
Next we specify Industria's investment behavior. Industria can
use present final goods for investment in order to increase its future
capital stock. Hence we have k2 =k1+i1,where i1 is investment in
the present andk1is the present capital stock, which is predetermined
and exogenously given. There is no investment in the future.
Industria has access to a competitive world credit market with a
final goods discount factor iS Cone over one plus the final goods rate of
interest). The equilibriwn level of investment maximizes the excess of
thepresent value of future GDP over the costof present investment, i.e.
the investment (demand) function Il(q2, 6,k1,92) solves the optimization
problem max1{6Y2(l, q2, k1 +i1,£2) —i1If.It follows that the invest-
ment function fulfills the first—order condition
(2.2) 6y(l, q2, k1 +11(42,6,k',i2)£2) =1,
that is, the present value of the future marginal product of capital
equalsunity, theprice of present investment goods.
Next we consider Industria's employment behavior. We assume initially
that labor is fixed in total supplyat each dateand that flexible wages
ensurea given (full)employmentlevel at each date. This full em-
ployment assumption will be relaxed in Section 6.
This completes the discussion of the supply side. Letusnowdeal7
with Industria's demand side. Regarding weifare and demand, weassume
thatIndustria can be represented by a well—behaved utility function
12 1 2 U(c ,c) ,where c andc are consumption of final goods in the present
andfuture, We let EU, 6, u) be the corresponding (present value)
expenditure function defined by EU, 6, u) =rnin(c'+6c2:U(c1, c2)> u}.t"
The expenditure function gives the minimum present value of expenditure
on consumption, measured in present final goods, required to reach a
given utility level.
By standard properties of expenditure functions, the partials of
the expenditure function with respect to its first two argunients are
equal to the Hicksian compensated demand functions for present and future
final goods. That is,
1 2
(2.3) c = andc =
Industria'sintertemporal budget constraint can now be given by
(2.4) EU, 6, u)+Iiq2,6, 9?) =
11(1,q1, i1) +612l,q2, I(q2, 6, Q2)9?
wherewe have suppressed the given capital stock k1. The budget con-
straint states that the present value of expenditure on consumption and
investmentequalsthepresent value of GD? in the present and thefuture.
It canbeunderstood as expressing the welfare level uas animplicit
functionof oil prices, the discount factor, andemployment levels.
Giventhis welfare level, output of final goods, oil imports, wages andB
conswnption in the present arid the future are given by (2.1) and(2.3),
and present investment is given by the investment function.
The budget constraint can alternatively be written asequating the
present value of expenditure on consumption to national wealth, W,
defined as W =(Y1—Ii)+6Y2,the sum of present GDP, net of invest-
ment, arid the present value of future GDP.
Let us now lookat OPEC. Weassume that OPEC sets oil prices q1 and
and supplies the world market (Industria) with the amount of oil it
demands. Since we disregard any costs of producing oil, as wellas oils
exhaustibility, OPEC wealth, W°, is simply the present value of total
oil output, q1z1 +6q2z2.With regard to welfare and demand, as for
Industrja, we let OPEC be represented by the expenditure function E°(1, 6, u°)
where u° is OPEC's welfare level, and the partials and £'are OPEC's
consumption at the two dates, with





OPEC's intertemporal budget constraint is
o o 1122_ 0
(2.6) E (1, 6, ii) =qz+ ôqz rW
which states that the present value of OPEC's consumption expenditure
equals the present value of oil output at the two dates, i.e. OPEC's
wealth. The budget constraint expresses OPEC's welfare level as an im-
plicit function of oil prices, the discount factor, andIndustria's oil
imports.9
Let usnextlookat a worldequilibrium, where the oil market and
the final goods market clear at each date. Due to Walras' Law, we
can disregard one of the market equilibria, and we choose to disregard
the future final goods market. Consequently, a world equilibrium can
be represented by the two countries' budget constraints, (2.4) and (2.6);
equilibrium in the oil markets at the two dates,
1 1 2 2
(2.7) —Y=zand —'1=z
q q
where Industria's oil demand equals OPEC's supply; arid equilibrium in
the present final goods market,
(2.8) E1
+4 + = =
whereworld consumption and investment of present final goods equal
Iridustri&ssupply. For exogenous oil prices q1 and q2andgiven(full)
employmentlevels and 2 equations (2.4) and (2.6) —(2.8)detcrmine
the two countries' welfare levels, u and u0, the discount factor 6, and
Industria's oil imports, l z2.
Industria'strade balances in the present andthefuture, b1 and
can alsobe calculatedsince they are merely the excess of GD? over
domestic absorption at each date. We find that




From (2.4) and the homogeneity of the expenditure function it follows
that trade is balanced over time inpresentvalue terms •butnot
necessarilyat each date, i.e.
(2.10) +6b2=0.
3. Welfare Effects
Let us first look at the effects of oil price increases on Industria's
welfare under conditions of wage flexibility arid constant (full) employ-
ment levels at each date. Differentiating the budget constraint (2.4)
and manipulating terms, we find that the change in Industria's welfare,
du, is given by
(3.1) Edu =-z'dq1—ôz2dq2+b2dô,
where E is the partial of the expenditure function with respect tin
thewelfare level and represents the inverse of the marginal utility of
wealth, which is positive. The expression EudU can be interpreted as a
wealth—equivalent welfare change.
Equation (3.1) indicates that Industria's welfare is affected by
changes in the oil terms of trade that occureach period,—z1dq1 and —z2dq2,
and by changes in the intertemporal terms of trade, b2dô. Oil price
increases deteriorate Industria's oil terms of trade and worsen its welfare,
but they may improve the intertomporal terms of trade, for instance if
the discount factor increases (the rate of interest falls) and Industria11
has a future trade surplus (and hence a deficit —anet debtor position —
inthepresent).we also note that the degree of substitutability in
production between oil, capital andlaborhas no direct (first—order)
effect on Industria's welfare.
Equation (3.1) provides a rigorous measure of the general—equilibrium
effects on the rest of the world of oil price increases, in contrast
to manystudieswhich merely evaluate these effects by looking at the
changed oil bill. We see that the change in the intertemporal terms of
trade must also be included in the calculation, since it has an important
effect on Industria's welfare as well.
4.TheDiscountFactor
In order to determine more completely the effects of oil price
increases on Industria's welfare, we must examine the determinants of
the endogenous change in the discount factor. Since the present final
goods market always clears, we know that any disturbance which creates
an incipient excess supply of present final goods must lead to an
increase in the discount rate (a fall in the real rate of interest) to
stimulate present spending.
To make the discussion clearer, we first look at the effect on the
discount factor of a temporary oil price increase, where only the present
oil price increases (dq1 >0and dq2 =0).We next examine the effect
of a future oil price increase (dq1 =0,dq2 >0).Given the model's
linearity, we then also know the effect on the discount factor of a
permanentoil price increase, where both present and future oil prices12
increase (dq', dq2 >0).
To calculate the effect on the discount factor of a temporary
oil price increase, we differentiate the market equilibrium conditions
for oil and present final goods, (2.7) and (2.8). After some substitutions






whereA >0is required for stabilityY-"
According to (4.1) ,atemporary oil price increase has an uncertain
impact on the discount factor. The ambiguity arises because the oil
price increase reduces both production and consumption of present final
goods.
Thebracketed expression in (4.1) can be viewed as the change in
the excess supply of present final goods due to the exogenous increase
in present oil prices. The first terra in brackets is the production
effect. It tends to lower excess supply. The reason is straightforward.
An increase in today's oil price reduces the demand for oil inputs,
sincethe ownprice substitution effect is always negative, and reduced
oilinputs depress current output since oil has a positive marginal
10/
product.
The second term in brackets reflects a transfer effect in consumption.
Industria reduces its consumption of present final goods because it faces
a deterioration in today's oil terms of trade. OPEC, meanwhile, increases
its consumption. if, consistent with the empirical regularities of the
1970s, we assume that Industria's marginal propensity to consume present13
goodsout of wealth exceeds OPEC'S (C1 > ),thereis a net drop in
world consumption of present final goods. This transfer effect tends
to increase excess supply.
Finally, the last term in brackets shows the fall in OPEC income
and consumption caused by Industria's reduced oil imports.
We conclude that a temporary oil price increase will cause an
incipient excess supply of present final goods and increase the discount
factor if the drop in world consumption dominates the drop in production.
Les us next look at the effect on the discount factor of a future
oil price increase. Again, differentiating the market equilibrium
conditions and manipulating, we get
(4.2) d3 =[—i+( —5)5z2 — l(z +zI1)]dq3'A>
0.
(—) (+) C—)(+) (—)
Anincrease in the future oil price creates an incipient excess supply
of present final goods since it lowers consumption and investment but
does not affect production. Consequently, the discount factor must
in crease.
The bracketed expression in (4.2) is the change in the excess supply
ofpresent final goods (at constant discount factor) caused by the increase
in the future oil price. Itispositive. The reasons are several.
First, investment demand for present final goods falls ifcapitaland
labor are cooperative. This follows because a future oil price increase
will lower future oil inputs, which under the cooperative assumption
will decrease the future marginal product of capital and hence present14
• U, .nvestment
Second, there is a transfer effect due to the change in the future
oil terms of trade. It leads to reduced consumption for present final
goodsby the same argument used for a temporary oil price increase.
Third, there is a drop in OPEC consumption due to the fall in
future oil imports. A future increase in oil prices reduces the demand
for future oil inputs directly and also has an indirect effect. If
oil and capital are cooperative, investment falls and future oil demand
will fall because the marginal product of oil will be less with a
12/
smaller future capital stock.
Hence, the fall in both investment and consumption give rise to
an incipient excess supply of present final goods, so the discount
factor must increase in response to the higher future oil price.
In order to determine the effect on the discount factor of a
permanent oil price increase, we merely sum the right—hand sides of
(4.1) and (4.2). All terms contribute to creating an incipient excess
supply except the production effect. If the latter is dominated, the
discountfactor rises for a permanent oil price increase.
Henceforth, we assume that a rise in the discountfactor is the
'normal'case, both for temporary and permanent oil price increases,
and we know that the discount factor unambiguously rises for a future
oil,price increase.
Ouranalysis of how the discount factor responds to permanent oil
priceincreases supports some of the simulation results obtained by
Sachs (1982) ,butit offers a richer understanding of the phenomena at
hand.Since itis based on an analytical general—equilibrium model, one15
thatincorporates the supply side and capital accumulation as well as
thedemandside and a general specification of preferences, we can
easily isolate the various pressures on the discount factor when oil
prices change. We see that these pressures arise from both the supply
and demand sides of the market forpresent final goods. Moreover, the
final outcome depends importantly on our assumptions that Cl) capital
and oil are cooperative and that (2) OPEC's marginal propensity to
consuire present final goods is less than Industria's.
Taking into account our knowledge about the effects of oil price
increaseson the discount factor, we can saysomething furtherabout
the change in Industria's welfare. If Industriais initially a net
borrowerfrom OPEC, and will thus have a future trade surplus(b2 >0)
Industriawill get anintertemporal terms of trade gain in welfare when
oilprices increase which can moderate its static oil terms of trade
losses.
5. The Trade Balance and Wage Response
We can use our results about the effects of oil price increases
on the discount factor and Industria's welfare to calculatethe change
in Industria's present trade balance. We merely differentiate (2.9),







Oilprice increases have an uncertain impacton Industria's trade
balance because they may reduce itsabsorption as well as its GOP. The
first term on the right—hand side of(5.1) is the fall in GOP caused by
the deterioration in Industria's oilterms of trade,It worsens the
trade balance, The second termrepresents the change in Industria's
consumption caused by its changed welfare. If oilprice increases
reduce Industrja's welfare, itsconsumption of present final goods will
decline,improving the trade balance. The third term isan intertempora],
consumption substitution effect. it worsens the tradebalance since
the rise in the discount factor increasesIndustria's consumption of
present final goods. The last two terms show the totalchange in
investment,which may riseor fall when oil andcapitalare cooperative.
Weconclude that a necessary and sufficientcondition for Industria's
trade balance to deteriorate is for thedrop in GOP and the rise in
absorption due to the increase in the discount factor todominate.
We also note that the smaller is OPEC'Smarginal propensity to
consume in the present and the smaller isOPEC's intertemporal substi-
tutionin consumption, the more likely it is thatIndustria's present
trade balance will deteriorate,'_Y Indeed, inthe limiting case where
OPECconsumes nothing in the present, Industria's tradebalance
unambiguouslydeteriorates,We can besteee this by observing that
OPEC'strade balance is the negative of Industria's, andin the limiting
case where OPEC's present consumption iszero, OPEC's trade balance is
merely b =q'z'.Diferentiating bC gives
oX 1 1.11 1 (5.2) db ——db=zdq +qdz17
which is positive if OPEC's oil revenues increase in the present. Thus
in this limiting case, both a temporary and a permanent oil price increase
deteriorate Industria's trade balance, whereas a future oil price increase
has no impact.Indeed,in the limiting case, the present trade balance
isindependent of the discount factor.
Finally, let us also examine the wage response to oil price
increaseswhen the discount factor also increases. Differentiating (2.2)
we find that for dgt >0,d& >0,







(—) (+) 1—) (+) (—) (4) (+)
We see from 15.3) that the present wage unambigously falls if labor and
1 14/
oil are cooperative C 0) ,whichwe have always assumed. We see
from (5.4) that the change in future wages is ambiguous. The future
oil price increase, at constant discount factor, unambiguously decreases
future wages, directly when labor and oil are cooperative (Y C 0) and
indirectly through a decrease in investment, if capital and oil, and
labor and capital are cooperative "Lk C0).-"However, an
increase in the discount factor, at constant oil prices1 increases
investment, which increases wages if capital and labor are cooperative.
We hence note the interesting possibility that the future wage rate
could be pushed up by an oil price increase, in spite of laborand oil
being cooperative.18
6.Rigid Wages andVariable Employment
Sofar we haveassumedflexiblewages and full employment in
Industria.In this section we shall examine the consequences of rigid
realwages and changes in employment (unemployment)in the present, with
flexiblewagesand fullemployment in thefuture.
If thepresentwageisfixed in terms of present final goods,the
levelof employnEnt isgivenby the condition that the demand price for
labor,4, equalsthewage,w1. Thiscondition determinesthepresent
employment function L1(w1,q1, k1) , which hencefulfills
1 11 11 1 1 1
(6.1) q • k , L (w , q • k )) = w
Thechange in the present employment level in response toanoil
price increase will be givenby
(6.2) dL1Jdq1<0.
q
Employmentfalls under our assumption that labor and oil arecooperative,
16/
and we note that this variation in employment is due to rigid wages.
To examine the effects on welfare, the discount factor, the trade
balance, etc. ,whenwages are rigid, we could now go through the same
exercise as in Sections 3—5, taking into account that employment is now
endogenous.However, a simpler way to understand how variable employ-
ment alters ourearlierresults is to find the effects, at constant oil
prices, of the change in employment given by (6.2). The effects of
changesin oilprices with endogenous changes in employment will simply
be the sumofthe effects of oil price changes at full employment and
the effects of the employment change at constant oil prices.
Hence, let us differentiate our system with constant oil prices19
andwith fullemploynent in thefuture1but with present employment
falling bydL1as in (6.2). Differentiatingthebudgetconstraint (2.4),
weget
(6.3) E du =b2dó+
U ()
Industria'swelfare is directly influenced by the decrease in present
GDP,w'di1,which we call the (wealth equivalent) enployxnent effect (on
welfare).Industria's welfare is also influenced by a change in the
intertemporal terms of trade, but since oil prices are constant, there
are no static oil terms of trade effects.
In order to determine completely the employment effect on welfarr.
wemust deterniine its effect on the discount factor. Hence, we differ-
entiate the equilibrium conditions for the oil markets and the present
final goods market, (2.7) and (2.8), to get
(6.5)d6 [4— — CYzt]dL'/A<0.
(+) (+)
Equation(6.5)indicates that a fall in employment decreases the
17/
discountfactor.The reason is that supply of final goods falls in
the present only,whereasthe drop in world consumption of final goods
isspreadover bothperiods.Hence the discount factor must decrease
to prevent anyexcessdemand.
Itfollowsthat Industria faces a deterioration in its jnterteniporal20
termsof trade. Combined with the adverse employment effect, Industria's
welfare unambiguously deteriorates when employment falls.
If we try to determine the change in industria's present trade
balance by differentiating (2.9), it appears ambiguous, since the fall
in employment will worsen it but the decrease in the discount factor
will improve it. If we look instead at OPEC's present trade balance,





The drop in Industria's employment reduces Industria's demand for oil
inputs (oil and labor are cooperative) and consequently OPEC's oil
production falls by q14dL'. If OPEC's marginal propensity to consume
in the present and its intertemporal stthstitution in consumption are
both small, or if OPEC consumes no final goods in the present, then
the production effect dominates, and OPEC's trade balance worsens while
Industria's improves.
Combining our results of a fall in present employment at constant
oil prices with our previous results of an increase in oil prices at
fullemployment, we can make the following statement: a given oil price
increase causes a smaller rise in the discount factor when wages are
rigid in the present period rather thanflexible.The discount factor
mayevenremain unchanged or decrease.' Whenpresentwages are rigid,
a given oil price also causes a greater drop in Industria's welfare, and21
itstrade balance is likely to deteriorate less.
7. Tariffs/Subsidies on Oil Imports
As we have shown in Sections 3 and 4, oil price increaseschange
Industria's welfare by altering the oil terms of trade and the inter—
temporal terms of trade. Recognizing this, Industria may wish to
pursue tariff policies that alter the terms of trade in its favor. Since
OPEC fixes the relative price of oil at each date, Industriacando
nothingabout turning the oil terms of trade in its favor. However, it
maybeable to improve its intertemporal terms of trade throughspecific
tariff policies.In this section, we consider the welfare consequences
ofIndustria imposing tariffs or subsidies on oil imports under the
restrictive assumption that OPEC doesnotretaliate. Inthenext section,
weexamine the consequences of Industria imposing a tax on capital
imports.
1 2 . .. Lett and tdenote the tariffs/subsidies per unit01].import in
the present and future, respectively. With q1 and q2 denoting the relative
prices of oil at the two dates, Industria's domestic relative prices of
oil at the two dates will be (q1 + t1) and (q2 + t2). Positive values
for t1 andt2 signify import tariffs,negative values import subsidies.
Notto burden our terminology too much, let us henceforth refer to t1
and t2 as (net) tariffs only, implicitly interpreting negative values
as subsidies.
Let the initial situation be one of zero tariffs, and assume flexible
wages and full employment. If Industria then imposes small tariffs, the22
welfareeffects can be calculated by differentiating a modified budget
19 /
constraintfor Industria that takes tariff revenues into account.
We find that
(7.1) Edu =b2d6,
thatis, Industria's welfare change depends only on the change in its
intertemporal terms of trade.
To find the effect of tariffs on the discount factor, we first make
thesimplifying assumption that OPEC consumes only in the future. Then,
20/
by differentiating modified market equilibrium conditions, we get
(7.2) d6=[x16t1—i1dt2]/A,
q q
still assuming zero initial tariffs.
We see that a small tariff increase on oil imports in the present
period reduces output by x1dt1 but has no effect on demand. Hence the
discount factor must fall to prevent any excess demand for present final
goods. Consequently, Industria will suffer a deterioration in its
intertemporal terms of trade and a welfare loss ifit taxespresent oil
imports.Somewhat surprisingly, Industria should subsidize rather than
taxoil imports in the present toimprove its welfare.
iegarding changes in future tariffs, note that a small increase
would decrease investment (11dt2 < 0) when oil and capital are cooperative,
and the discount factor would have to increase to maintain equilibriu.'n23
inthe market for present final goods. A tax on future oil imports thus
improvesIndustria'swelfare.Hence, under the restrictive assumption
that oil prices are exogenous, Industria should subsidize present oil
importsandtaxfuture ones.
Letusalso briefly look at these issues when there are rigid wages
andvariableemployment in the present. The change in employment given




Asmall subsidy Cdt1 <0)increases employment whereas a small tariff
decreases it. From the analysis in Section 6 it follows that a subsidy
which increases employment improves Industria's welfare. We conclude
that rigid wages in the present provide a separate case for Industria to
subsidizeits present oil imports.
B.Restricted Capital Mobility
Sofar we have assumed that there is perfect mobility of financial
capital between Industria and OPEC, in the sense that the two countries
have access to the same competitive world credit market with the same
rate of interest. We shall now deal with the case when there are some
impedimentsto international capital movements. Weagain assume full
employmentand that OPEC consumes only in the future.
We choose to represent the impediments to international capital
mthility by having Industria impose a small tax on interest payments to24
OPEC. This tax draws a wedge between Industria's hone rate of interest,
r', andtheworld, i.e. OPEC's, rate of interest, r, such thatr' >r.
Equivalently, the tax draws a wedge, I >0,between OPEC'S discount
21/
factor, 6,and Industria's,6—T. We assume that the tax revenues
are distributed to Industria's consumers in a lumpsumway.Then, assuming
fullemployment and an initial zero tax level, we differentiate a
modified budget constraint with respect to a small tax (dt >0),getting
Edu=b2do3YThatis, Industria's welfare change depends only on changes
inthe intertemporal terms of trade.
Differentiating a modified marketequilibrium condition with respect





Thesmall tax on interest paid to OPEC reduces Industria's absorption of
present final goods.Under the restrictive assumption that oil prices
remain unchanged, itfollowsthat the world discount factor increases
and Industria'swelfare indeed improves when itimposes a small tax on
24/
interest payments. —
Whenwagesare rigid andemployment is variable in the present, the
impositionof a tax on interest has no effect on employment.Consequently,
weconclude that Industria can improve its welfare by taxing capital
imports even when present wages are rigid.
We might ask whether we can rank oil tariffs/subsidies and capital
import taxation in terms of their effect on Industria'swelfare. For full25
employment, we might compare the right—hand sides of (7.2) and (8.1).
Without further specifying the parameters it cannot be said which policy
would have a larger effect on the discount factor and hence on welfare,
although intuition might lead us to think that capital import taxation
would be a more direct way of influencing the discount factor. Note,
though, that if there are presently rigid wages, a present oil subsidy,
in contrast to capital import taxation, does affect employment and have an
additional influence on Industria's welfare. If the enployment effect
is strong enough, subsidies on present oil imports will have a larger effect
on Industria's welfare than taxes on capital Imports.
9. concluding Remarks
Under the assumption that factors of production are cooperative,
we have shown that OPEC price increases deteriorate Industria's oil
terms of trade but they may improve its intertemporal terms of trade
if interest rates fall and Industria is a net borrower in the present.
We have also established precise conditions under which interest rates
may, in fact, fall. The analysis also indicates that OPEC price increases
may increase or decrease present investment in Industria, that Industria's
trade balance is likely to deteriorate, that current wages will fall but
future wages may rise or fall depending on the change in investment.
If wages are rigid in Industria, oil price increases decrease
employment when factors are cooperative. The fall in the rate of
interest is then reduced or even reversed compared to the case with
flexible wages. Industria's welfare deteriorates more and its trade26
balancedeteriorates less.
We have also shown that for given oil prices, oil importerscan
improve their welfare by subsidizing present oil imports and taxing
future oil imports or by taxing capital imports from OPEC.
We should also mention some limitations of the analysis. Since
our model is designed to concentrate on certain general—equilibrium
interrelationships, especially the effects of oil price increases or
tax policies on Industria's welfare, a two-country framework is adequate.
However, in focussing on just two blocs —OPECversus the oil importers —
themodel abstracts from intra—bloc differences. Some implications of
theseintra-bloc differences are analyzed in Dixit (1981) and in Marion
andSvensson(1982). Ourmodelalso ignores the special feature of oil
as an exhaustible resource ard the nature of OPEC's pricing decision.
The relative price of oil in terms of final goods is treated asexogenous.
Whilethis is acceptable given the questions being asked, the welfare
implications of changes in oil prices that are optimally set by OPEC need
to be studied as well.
While these issues provide important areas for further research, the
principal concern of this paper is to analyze some important general—
equilibrium interrelationships in detail and so to increase our under-
standing of the effects of oil price increases and taxpolicies on
important macroeconomic variables. In spite of including endogenous
international capital flows, capital accumulation in Industria, and
anendogenous world rate of interest, we have nevertheless been able
toderive fairly clear—cut results, bothunder conditions of full
employmentand unemployment. Our analysis has also made explicit the
precise qualifications of these results.F—i
FOOTNOTES
*Weappreciate helpful comments from Avinash Dixit, Assaf Razin, an
anonymousreferee and participantsin the Workshop on Open Economy
Macroeconomicsheldat the Institute for International Economic Studies
in Stockholm August of 1981. we gratefully acknowledge financial support
fromthe Research Foundations of Svenska Handeisbanken and Torsten
andRagnar Sèderberg.
_!./calling the oil—importing bloc Industria is inspired by Calvo
and Findlay (1978).
explicitly intertemporal but partialequilibrium analyses
of the effects of oil price increases,see Bruno (1982),Marion(1981)
Obstfeld(1980),Sachs(1981) and Svensson (1981) .Fora general—
equilibrium analysis within the monetary approach to the balance of
payments and hence without an explicitly intertemporal framework, see
Schmid (1976)
—"Throughout our analysis we will maintain the assumption that
capital, labor and oil are cooperative in Industria, in the technical
sense that their cross partials in the production functions are positive.
This assumption makes sense for this level of aggregation, and it is not
very restrictive. The definition of cooperation is different from the
usual definitions of complementarity or substitutability in production
which make reference to the sign of the partial of the demand for a
factor with respect to the price of another factor at a given output
level. See Berndt and Wood (1979) for a thorough discussion of suchF—2
}Iicksiancomplementarity/substitutabjiity between energy and other
factors.Factors can be }licksian substitutes yet cooperative in our
sense. This is indeed the case with the specific separable technologies
discussed by Berndt and Wood where x = f[g(k, e), h(Z, in))andf(.),
g() and h(') are linearly homogenous, e is the energy input, and inis
the input of non—energy materials.
A frequent assumption in the literature is weak separability between
oil and a capital—labor composite factor. Then we have x = f[v(k, Z)
,z)
where f(S) and v(S) are linearly homogenous. It is readily checked that
in this case capital, labor and oil are cooperative in our sense.
_±_"There is evidence that world interestrates fell during the
1973—1979 period. See Sachs (1981, pp. 223—35)
--'See Dixit and Norman (1980)or Varian (1978) for a discussion
of the properties of GOP, or revenue, functions.
Dixit and Norman (1980) or Varian (1978) for a discussion of
the properties of expenditure functions.
can be seen from inspection of (2.9), Industria's present
trade surplus is equal to GOP (Y1) minus domestic absorption (E1 +Ii)
Alternatively, the trade surplus represents the excess of domestic
saving (Y1 —E1)over investment (Ii). Furthermore, since = x' -
wecan write the trade surplus as exports (x1 —Li-Il)minus imports
(q1z1). Since there is no initial debt and hence no interest payments
in the present, the present trade surplus is also equal to the current—
account surplus and represents the net accumulation of foreign assets.F-3
the differentiation we use (3.1) and we also use (2.6) to
get E°du° =z1dq1+6z2dq2—b266+ qdz'+6q2dz2.We define as
Industrias marginal propensity to consume present final goods out of
wealth, where C' =E/E We define OPEC's
ol ci 00
wluu' MPC as C,whereC =E/E
Wluu
We assume thatconsumptionis normal in both periods, so that 0 < C1 —WV
ccj.
2'HereA is the derivative of world excess demand for present goods
with respect to the discount factor. If oil prices are given, oil markets
are always in equilibrium, and the discountfactor adjusts to clearthe
market for present final goods, then a necessary and sufficient condition
for stability is A >0.That is, a rise in the discount factor (a fall in
the rate of interest) increases excess world demand for present final goods
(decreases net saving). Note that A isgiven by
o 1 1 ol.2ol 221 ++ 6+ —
C.1.)b+ CóqZkto.
The first three terms
represent the intertemporal substitution effects and theinvestment
effectof a discount factor change. They are all positive.(The con-
sumption cross substitution effects are positive since there are only
two consumer goods, present and future final goods.) The investment
substitution effect is positive since I=- >0; investment
always increases with the discount factor. The fourth term is a transfer
effect. It is positive under the plausible assumptions that Industria
has a current trade deficit (and hence a surplus in the future, with
b2 > 0),andthat OPEC's marginal propensity to consun present final
goodsisless than Industria's (C —C
> 0).Thelast term is also
positivesince anincrease in investment due to an increase in the discount
factor(I
> 0) leads to an increase in future oil imports (zId6 > 0)have, by differentiating (2.2) ,
iff2 >0.
kz
have =- 2= >0, if
k qk kz zz






have z1 Y1 0 by convexity
c; qq
Yq
1 =— Y=qzS 0 since
qq q
+qY =0. In terms ofthe
<N
0 andx1= f/fSO since
q ZZZ
kz
11 o q z —E1.Differentiating,
F—4
underour assumption that capital and oil are cooperative. Hence all
termsare indeed positive, and thereis no conflict between the assumption
ofstability and our other assumptions.
terms of





the GOP function we
inprices,and x' =




= — Yq/Y=— < 0
b2dä +qldzl+óq2dz2)-
E5d6.
(+) (+) (+) (+)
The smaller is andE5,the more likely it is that dbOl>0 and hencedb1< 0.
have =f/f1
<0iff >0.An increase in the oil
price reduces oil inputs which reduces the marginal product of labor.
have =Lk-ff/f2
>0if >o.
'Notethat by differentiating (6.1) ,= —Y/Y<0if C 0.
!Z/"The proof is as follows. The present GDP function fulfills
1 1 1.1 1 1 11)
Y=x —qz. Hencew =i=x—qz>Oandweet
4
— w1— — 0.Since 0 C C 1and 0C C 1andw1,4> a,F-s
1 1olil . weget x2 —Cw
—q > 0. Since we are investigating the case of
an employment decrease, dL1 C0.
'Sachs'(1982) simulation results also indicate that real wage
rigidity may reduce or even reverse the fall in short-term interest rates
caused by an oil price increase.
"Thc budget constraint is E(l, 5, u) + 11(q2 +t2, 5)Y(1, q1+t1) +
2 22 12 2 11 22
6Y (1, q +t •I(q +t .6)) +t z +Stz,where the last two terms
represent the tariff revenues. Differentiation gives
Edu +b2d5+t1dz1+St2dz2.By assumption, t1 =t20 initially.
'Differentiating the market equilibrium conditions gives
AdSx1dt' —11dt2—C1(t1z1dt1 +St2z2dt2+6t2z211dt2).The terms in
q q W q q kq
parentheses drop out by the assumption of zero initial tariffs. The
term A equals E16 + + + Ct2zI1 >o.
21/ I I —Itcan be shown that T =(r—r)rS/(l+r). Having Industria
impose a tax on interest payments to OPEC is formally equivalent to
imposing a (present value) tax t per unit of future net exports, b2.
The tax decreases the relative price between future and present final
goods, i.e. the discount factor, from 6 to 5 -T,andgives rise to
(present value) tax revenues it2. what we have here is just an intertem-
pora]. example of Lerner's classic theorem on the equivalence between
import and export taxes. In our framework, taxing present capital imports,
—b1, is equivalent to taxing the corresponding future capital exports,
b2. We refer to Marion and Svensson (1981) for details.
'The budget constraint is E(1, S -, u)+11(g2,6 —t}
Y(1,q1) +(6—t)Y2(l,q2, 11(q2, 6 —ii)+ Tb2, where the last term
is the present value of the tax revenues. Differentiating givesEudu =b2d6+ Tab2. But T =0initially.
"Here, A =E1+ I + (1 —(r/5Hcb2 >0. The term —(T/6)cb2
isdue to the fact that an increase in the discount factorcauses a
change in the future trade balance which leads to a negative tax revenue
effect on welfare that reduces excess demand. This is theanalogue of
the usual "tariff multiplier" in standard trade theory. Since 6— T> 0,
the term (1 -(TIcS))is clearly positive, hence so is A.
a somewhat different context, Dixit (1981) shows that a
tariff levied by the oil-importing country on present oil imports with
the aim of cutting back its oil dependence reduces the present value
price of future goods (6) and harms the oil importer if it remains a
net exporter of industrial goods in the future, i.e. if b2 > 0.R- 1
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